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This study analyzes the ownership-performance relationship in large-scale farms using 
extensive survey and farm accountancy data from Czech agriculture. Controlling for ownership 
endogeneity, no significant influence of ownership on financial performance was found. However, 
ownership concentration and managerial ownership positively effect labor productivity. Farm group 
analysis detects highly heterogeneous ownership form combinations and suggests that ownership 
endogeneity stems from mutual sources with economic performance. The results imply that one of 
these sources is management quality and its ownership transformation strategies. They further disclose 
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  21  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The European Union's (EU) May 2004 enlargement brought with it an increase of large-scale 
farms’ representation in the EU agricultural structures. Large-scale farming is not characteristic in all 
new member states, however, in some it has retained its significant representation and importance in 
the agricultural sectors. The large-scale farms in these countries have been analyzed in various 
contexts, such as efficiency and economic growth (e.g. Latruff et al. 2005, Curtiss 2002) or structural 
changes and property rights development (e.g. Schlüter 2001, Brem 2000). In the context of efficiency 
and economic advantage, large-scale farms have been mostly empirically analyzed in comparison to 
smaller family type farms, or their size and legal form efficiency effects have been discussed. Not only 
do theoretical contradictions predominate the literature, but the empirical analyses also have not 
brought forth unique conclusions about the large-scale farms’ economic advantages or disadvantages. 
This could be a consequence of the fact that differences between the large-scale farms are much more 
far-reaching than implied by their often analyzed legal forms. Deeper and more detailed analysis is 
called for to understand possible future farm structure development in the new model of EU 
agriculture. 
 
Theoretical discussions, e.g. by Beckmann (2000), consider, in addition to various legal 
forms, possible economic advantages and disadvantages of hierarchical, flat and other organizational 
forms suitable for agricultural production. However, considering the marked heterogeneity of 
emerging ownership structures in transition countries makes the theoretical discourse more 
complicated and places greater importance on empirical studies. The wide variety of ownership 
configurations in transition economies has been viewed as a unique opportunity by many researchers. 
The large set of empirical studies which consider ownership form performance relationships and the 
factors of ownership structure development in more detail, however, do not consider agriculture in 
particular. For example, Estrin and Angelucci (2003) in their analysis of Russian firms did not identify 
obvious differences in performance between insider- and outsider-owned firms, while Frydman et al. 
(1999) found that for 10 Central European countries, outsider owners outperform insiders. Jones and 
Mygind (2000) found evidence from Estonia that manager-owned firms display better performance 
than employee-owned firms, although employee-owned firms do not grossly underperform. Also in 
Estonia, Kalmi and Mygind (2003) showed, based on their 12 case studies, that ownership change, for 
example from employee ownership to manager ownership, speeds up restructuring and is thus viewed 
as efficient. Jones et al. (2003) conclude that managers gain their ownership stakes by means of their 
information advantages and hierarchical positions over employees. Still, their findings support the 
notion that this is largely a result of efficiency concerns and leads them to the conclusion that a rapid 
decline in employee ownership can be expected. Their empirical findings are in accordance with the 
view that efficiency considerations drive ownership changes, which is not consistent with findings by 
Schlüter (2001) and Milczarek (2002), who for the case of Czech and Polish agriculture, respectively, 
state that ownership changes are mostly the result of some agents’, especially managers’, bargaining 
power and opportunism. 
 
The privatization processes in Czech agriculture have resulted in the development of diverse 
ownership structures, especially since approximately 70% of agricultural land remains cultivated by 
large-scale farms of various legal forms. The prevalent trait of this ownership structure is that, aside 
from being very fragmented, it is associated with high discrepancies between ownership and capital 
use. This implies a low ownership concentration and a high share of external (investor) ownership. 
Another interesting distinction is the high level of employee ownership, which has undergone 
significant changes during transition due to the emerging trade with property rights. As cited by 
Chaplin et al. (2000), the Czech Statistical Office (CzSO 2001) shows that the share of hired workers 
(including managers) having no capital stock in farms in agricultural labor has increased since 1995 
(from 38% in 1995 to 66% in 2001). From the owners' perspective, the working members and 
shareholders of co-operatives and joint stock companies represented 20% of agricultural labor in 2001 
(Chaplin et al. 2000). These developing ownership structures are interesting farm features related to 
agency problems, which possibly contribute to explaining a farm economic success or failure. The 
case of Czech agriculture, with its distinct degrees of ownership concentration, investor and employee 
ownership, and also managerial ownership, provides a particularly interesting compass for an 
empirical analysis.   
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The objective of this study is to empirically analyze the ownership structures in Czech 
agriculture and the ownership-performance relationship. We collected ownership structure data for 
2003, as well as data on restructuring processes in the farms, and combined these with farm 
accountancy data for 2002 and 2003. We select four ownership characteristics – ownership 
concentration, investor, employee and managerial ownership – and analyze their effect on 
performance as represented by profitability and productivity indicators. We test and control for 
endogeneity of ownership structure, since it has been the subject of a controversy in the literature 
introduced by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Using principal component and cluster 
analysis, we detect significantly different groups of similar enterprises with respect to ownership 
structure, farm development and performance. This is motivated by the possibility of the simultaneous 
occurrence of chosen ownership characteristics on one farm and their different developmental paths 
which could not be captured by the performance model. By means of these analyses of the data unique 
in its detail, this study should contribute to the better understanding of large-scale farm performance 
heterogeneity and ownership form role in future structural changes in Czech agriculture. 
 
 
2  DEBATE ON OWNERSHIP-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
The ownership structure relationship to firm performance has received much attention in 
theoretical and empirical research since Berle and Means (1932/1967) formulated the agency problem, 
which stems from the separation of ownership and control. In the context of transition, this 
relationship became a relevant research problem not at the moment when property rights were 
politically (mostly sub-optimally) restored, but when they became a subject of free trade. Keeping 
with the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960), the free ownership shares market was expected to lead to 
efficiency-enhancing ownership change. One of the reasons why the ownership market should select 
the more efficient ownership configuration is because of the opportunities for mutually beneficial 
transactions: more efficient owners who are able to create more value would buy shares from less-
efficient owners (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Demsetz and Lehn 1985, Hansmann 1996). Furthermore, 
product market competition should force inefficient firms, for which the costs of ownership are high, 
out of the market or to sell equity to other investors (Jones et al. 2003).  
 
There are various characteristics of ownership related to the location of ownership rights 
within the firm: rights held primarily by investors, consumers, employees, some sub-categories of 
these groups or their combination (Ricketts 2003). As indicated above, the ownership reforms in 
transition economies created convenient conditions for the formation, but not stabilization, of 
employee ownership. Dow (2003) describes the advantages of employee ownership as incentive 
optimism and its disadvantages as finance pessimism. That is, employee ownership should align the 
incentives of insiders with the companies' performance; on the other hand, employees as owners are 
more risk-averse and have consumption time preferences, which reduce the investment activity of the 
business. The incentive effect is further considered as more important in more labor-intensive 
productions (Jones and Kato 1993) however, it decreases with the size of the company as a result of 
the high cost of collective decision-making (Hansmann 1996). This also supports Alchian and 
Demsetz’s (1972) argument that managerial ownership, which reduces the degree of collective 
decision-making, becomes more favorable with the increase of a company’s size. 
 
Since employee ownership is not expected to be stable in transition agriculture, we are 
interested in the direction of ownership changes and their efficiency implication. One theoretical thesis 
posits that successful employee-owned firms are more likely to convert into conventional ownership 
structures, because departing employees are more likely to get a good return from selling shares to 
outside investors (e.g. Miyazaki, 1984). However, if we consider transition specifics such as the large 
number of employee-owners and their higher interest in departing due to high age and liquidity 
constrains, the lower attraction of agriculture due to its high indebtedness, financial problems and 
elimination of state support, managers’ low alternative employment options and knowledge of the 
economic situation of the companies, we rather hypothesize that more successful agricultural 
enterprises are expected to have a more  concentrated and managerial ownership structure with lower 
investor ownership. 
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This hypothesis is also supported by the statement by Wright et al. (2001), who state that 
management buy-outs often occur in order to solve agency problems between managers and owners, 
which can be a problem in the transitional agricultural sector due to the high representation of large-
scale and cooperative farming. They also argue that management buy-outs happen when ownership 
share prices are lower than the managements’ subjective valuation of the firms' managers, which is 
often the case in better companies. Management can better detect successes when compared to (other) 
owners and can influence the price of shares. On the other hand, a poorly-performing firm will not be 
attractive to managers and may have to turn to investors out of necessity, (Jones et al. 2003) which 
does not solve possible agency problems. Considering these arguments, we set another hypothesis for 
the Czech case: that underperforming companies had greater difficulties settling the transformation 
claims of eligible persons, and in order to survive, they had to convince the persons entitled to their 
equity to capitalize their shares and thus become investors in the company. Therefore, companies with 
a higher share of investor ownership are expected to be less well-performing. 
 
As the above discussion suggests, the causality in the ownership-performance relationship and 
the problem of endogeneity is seldom addressed. Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
questioned the effect of ownership on performance and initiated the ownership endogeneity discussion 
when they illustrated that ownership is endogenously determined to reach a trade-of between several 
costs advantages and disadvantages in the firm. Some empirical studies have followed these concerns 
and found ambiguous results. Studies finding ownership structure endogeneity (e.g. Demsetz and 
Villalonga 2001, Himmelberg et al. 1999) showed that it can have two different sources, simultaneity 
between ownership and performance or individual firm heterogeneity, which affects both firm 
performance and ownership structure. Since this study will take the possible endogeneity problem into 
account, possible factors of ownership endogeneity are discussed in more detail in the context of 
variables choice in Section 4. 
 
 
3  TRANSFORMATION OF OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN CZECH AGRICULTURE  
 
 
This section should illuminate the ownership structures development in Czech agriculture, the reasons 
for large-scale farm survival and transformation strategies leading to the farms’ ownership form 
variability.     
 
The communist regime of 1948 – 1989 introduced a socialistic form of farming represented by 
state and collective farms
2. This led to the creation of large-scale farms with aspects of 
industrialization and intensification, which accounted for almost all farm output (OECD 1995). At the 
beginning of transition collective farms played the dominant role in Czech agriculture. Collective 
farms operated on 62% of the total agricultural land and accounted for almost 70% of agricultural 
production. Second in importance were state farms, which occupied 37% of the total agricultural land 
and produced 29% of agricultural production. The 3,205 small farmers who were able to keep their 
effective property rights had less than 1% of the total agricultural land and production. 
 
Contemporary farm structure in the Czech Republic is a consequence of extensive 
restructuring, which was initiated by privatisation and the introduction of new commercial law. The 
privatisation process started in 1990-91 with the restitution of expropriated and collectivized assets 
and land. The second form of privatization was transformation, which referred to the redistribution of 
assets of collective farms accumulated after collectivisation. Transformation of cooperatives was, for 
the largest part, carried out from 1992 to 1993. The third form of privatization was the sale of state 
assets (1994-95). Restitutions restored land ownership of about 70 – 75% of the total agricultural land. 
The remaining land was state owned and was excluded from privatisation until 2000). The agricultural 
assets were privatized by respective privatisation forms by almost 100%. The intention of reforms was 
to individualize property rights and correct former injustices (Ratinger, Rabinowicz 1997). As a result, 
the reforms created a very fragmented ownership structure, with about 3.5 million landowners on an 
average land property of 1 hectare, and roughly the same number of claims to non-land assets. 
 
  5In the initial stage of transition prior to 1995, the total area cultivated by individual private 
farmers (IPF) expanded rapidly. It achieved more than 23% in agricultural land use, but did not 
achieve the expected extent. Large corporate farms have kept their important role in the sector 
(Lerman et al. 2002) in spite of earlier considerable support by irrevocable loans, which were later 
changed into interest free loans. The unfulfilled expectations could be explained by the following 
arguments: owners’ specialisation in non-agricultural jobs; problems with the identification of plots in 
terrain; access to land and limited divisibility of non-land assets; rather small individual property 
shares and land plots for establishing commercial farms, and; the defensive position of a conservative 
rural population to a risky agrarian business (Divila 2001, Ratinger, Rabinowicz 1997, Curtiss et al. 
2003). After 1995, new entrants occurred only in a limited number. The growing share of IPF land was 
caused rather by slowly increasing size. For example, between 1995 and 2003, the average individual 
farm size of the category of farms over 100 hectares increased by 15% (CzSO 1996, 2004). 
 
In the case of corporate farms, the number of cooperatives slowly increased during the first 
stage of transition in comparison with the pre-transition time. However, the cooperatives’ average area 
decreased by 45%, to 1,450 hectares, caused by the application of the Transformation Act, which 
called for obligatory transformation. Less than 10% of former collective farms were transformed 
directly into other business forms; nearly 2% of them were liquidated and the rest transformed into 
cooperatives (Chloupková 2001). Newly-emerged cooperatives were often divided into other types of 
cooperatives, mostly because of local interests such as better land location, re-distribution of 
specializations within the cooperative, etc. Cooperatives could be also split into two or more 
companies, so that one part was constituted by member shares allocated in that cooperative and the 
other one was to be used for non-members' claim settlements and thus, consequently, to go bankrupt. 
 
Two other new organisational forms emerged; Joint Stock Companies (JSC) and Limited 
Liability Companies (LLC). The earlier-established JSC mostly originated from voucher privatisation 
of state farms, while LLC were mostly established by means of state farms’ non-land assets sales in 
tenders. LLC were also established by larger restituents, who were often led by former managers of 
cooperative or state farms, and/or the dividing of transformed cooperatives, or later by the merger of 
individual farmers.  
 
The most notable shift in the corporate sector between cooperatives and JSC was in the 
second phase of restructuring (after 1995). This relates to the problem that successors of collective 
farms had to deal with claims on assets by non-farming heirs of original owners, so-called “eligible 
persons” that were not members of cooperatives. These transformation claims were frozen until the 
end of 1999, when they became real liabilities, mostly to cooperatives. Since there has not been 
enough profit generated in cooperatives, monetary compensation has happened only rarely. 
Capitalisation of claims in a form of (non-tradable) co-operative membership suffers from the problem 
of future (monetary) withdrawal (Divila 2003) and these eligible persons insisted on compensation. 
Therefore, a transfer of restitution claims into “tradable” shares of JSC has been regarded as a 
pragmatic option. Divila (2003) suggests that a few hundred cooperatives (about 60%) used this 
manner of claims composition with eligible persons. This process has led to more fragmented 
ownership of the newly-established JSC, but “tradable shares” could lead to more concentrated 
ownership. The future of cooperatives which have not yet settled their transformation claims is still not 
legally clarified and their existence is in danger from the side of eligible persons, that is, non-
members. 
 
In reality, the ways in which agricultural organizations could be set up were tremendously 
heterogeneous and to some extent complicated. The vague Transformation Act, which was supposed 
to remedy the injustices in property rights, amendments in that and related Acts, and the frequent 
helplessness of executive and legislative bodies have all contributed to weak transparency and a 
complicated organizational setting. Another less-discussed issue which influenced the structural 
development of Czech agriculture was the fact that companies established from state farms were 
obliged to settle privatisation debts, as were co-operatives, but in the first case debts were partly 
forgiven. This all suggests that farm restructuring, especially in the initial stage of transformation, was 
affected by a highly politicized privatisation process; therefore, the established farm structures were 
unlikely to be economically optimal. However, as the discussion also showed, later changes occurred 
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structures based on efficiency principle. These are the subject of the following empirical analysis. 
 
 
4  METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
 
 
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, the relationship between selected 
performance indicators and ownership structure is analyzed in a regression model using instrumental 
variables which allow to control for the endogeneity problem. We assume the endogeneity problem 
originates in the simultaneity of the performance and ownership form variables. In the second part, 
multivariate data analyses, concrete principle component and cluster analyses are used to detect 




The endogeneity problem in regressions occurs when an error term is correlated with an 
explanatory variable, which, as discussed in the literature, is likely to be the case of the performance 
ownership relationship (see discussion above). We use a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation 
procedure that eliminates this problem and provides unbiased estimates. The performance model is 
defined as follows: 
 
(1)  i il l ik k i Z X Y ε γ β α + + + =  
 
instruments Zil and Sim.  
 
where Y is a performance indicator; Xk is an 1xk vector of ownership form variables; Zl is an 1xl vector 
of variables that are correlated with both X and the error term ε, while Sm is an 1xm vector of variables 
correlated only with X; the i subscript at each variable represents ith for which the variables are 
observed, and α, β, γ as well as the below-presented δ and θ are parameters to be estimated. Using the 
2SLS, we first run Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
 
(2)  i im m il l ik S Z X µ θ δ λ + + + =  
 
and obtain predicted X values 
 
(3)    im m il l ik S Z X θ δ λ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + =
 
Using this procedure, the ownership variable X is decomposed into a part that is uncorrelated with the 
random term ε and part correlated with ε. In the second step, we run OLS regression using    ik X ˆ
        
(4)   
* ˆ
i il l ik k i Z X Y ε γ β α + + + =
 
The component of X that was correlated with ε moved into the error and a new error term ε 
* enters the 
equation. The other part of X that was uncorrelated with ε stays as an explanatory variable. The 
instruments thus isolate the covariation between yi and xi; hence, the endogeneity problem is 
controlled. Estimated parameters β indicate the real effect of ownership on performance not caused by 
joint explanatory variables. 
 
Ownership structure and further farm characteristic data utilized in this paper were collected 
in the Czech Republic in 2004. This extensive data survey was organized by the Institute for 
Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) and by the Research Institute for 
Agricultural Economics in Prague (VUZE). The ownership data, unique in its detail, was extended by 
data from the Czech Farm Accountancy Data Network for the years 2002 and 2003. These served for 
the derivation of financial analysis and productivity indicators. The sample consists of data on 166 
agricultural enterprises with legal entity status. They include 87 cooperatives, 57 JSC and 22 LLC. 
This configuration reflects the farms’ willingness to cooperate with data collection rather than the farm 
structure in Czech agriculture described in Section 3. The firms in the sample can be mostly classified 
  7as farms with combined crop and animal production, whereas they differ significantly in their size and 
crop/animal production proportions. 
 
The ownership form effect on farms' performance is analyzed by pooling two year unbalanced 
panel data. Farms were eliminated from the analysis for which missing values of included variables 
occurred. The model includes 222 observations (i = 1,2…, N; N = 222); 113 for the year 2002 and 109 
for 2003. The model is estimated separately for three different performance indicators (Yi). The first 
two parameters relate to farm profitability. We use Return on Assets (PROFIT1) which represents the 
Gross Farm Surplus
4 generated from agricultural and non-agricultural activities, including operational 
subsidies
5 divided by total assets. The second profitability indicator (PROFIT2) is also a Return on 
Assets indicator, with the only difference being that operational subsidies get subtracted from Gross 
Farm Surplus. The last endogenous variable used in the analysis is labor productivity (LABORPROD) 
defined as total revenues from agricultural and non-agricultural production, divided by total working 
hours.       
 
The explanatory variables, Xik, are represented by four ownership structure variables. Due to 
the correlation between some of them, two in three combinations are used in separate performance 
models (k = 2). Hence, the total number of estimated models when using three different endogenous 
variables is nine (see Table 1). The ownership structure is proxied by ownership concentration 
(CAPCONC) represented by capital stock per owner, external ownership (EXTEROWN) as given by 
the share of employed owners in the agricultural company to the total number of owners, employee 
ownership (EMPLOWN) defined as the share of employed owners to total number of employees, and 
managerial ownership (MANOWN) as a dummy variable, where 1 indicates if managers own higher 
shares of the company, and 0 if managers own the same or smaller shares compared to other owners. 
 
   The vector of Zil variables includes six variables that are expected to explain ownership 
structure as well as performance level, and may thus be a potential source of endogeneity (l = 6). 
There are exogenous as well as instrumental variables in the performance model. Director’s age and 
education (DIRAGE and DIREDUC, respectively) and management members’ average age 
(MANAGAGE) are characteristics which are, in transition conditions, expected to influence 
ownership form choice. This is supported, for example, by the study by Schlüter (2001), who pointed 
out that privatization in Czech agriculture was strongly influenced by former managers’ bargaining 
power and managers’ strong information asymmetries. At the same time, these variables are associated 
with management quality and the level of risk-aversion, which can influence the farm performance, 
and therefore are often included in farm efficiency analysis (e.g. Mathijs and Vranken 2001).         
 
Other variables included in the model that are expected to affect both ownership and 
performance are farm size (SIZE), the level of liquidity (LIQUIDITY) and farm indebtedness (DEBT). 
A larger farm size, defined here as total capital utilized by the company, is expected to relate to lower 
ownership concentration. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) state that the larger the firm and its capital 
resources, the more difficult it is to own a given fraction of the firm. Simultaneously, size can have a 
direct effect on farm performance through the dispersion of fixed costs. Farm liquidity is represented 
by quick ratio, which is equal to current assets minus inventory and uncollectible receivables, divided 
by current liabilities. Indebtedness is measured by the ratio of total farm liabilities to total assets. 
Similar to Himmelberg et al. (1999) who discussed the effect of intangible assets and market power, 
we argue that farm lower liquidity and higher indebtedness increase the company’s values, leverage, 
adaptability and riskiness, and leads to higher levels of insider ownership so as to align incentives and 
to control for managerial discretion.    
 
The last group of variables, Sim, represents four variables that are expected to influence the 
ownership structure only, and which are included in the performance model only as instrumental 
variables (m = 4). The first two variables, involvement of the company in local cultural activities 
(CULTACT) and workers’ employment due to social reasons (SOCEMPL) are variables which should 
express the strength of path-dependencies and their effect on ownership choice in the region. 
Production specialization (SPEC) is given by the share of revenues from crop production to the total 
revenues from agricultural production. It is, due to location allegiance and the limited financial 
resources during transition, viewed as semi-fixed over time, so that adjustment in ownership and 
organization are expected more than significant changes in production specialization. Through the 
  8ability to adjust the ownership structure efficiently to the inherited specialization in transition, 
specialization can affect farm performance. The last variable in the performance model concerns the 
work alternatives for the workers of a farm (WORKALTERN). This should reflect the general 
conditions of the persons eligible for transformation claims (ownership shares) under which they 
decided about their ownership involvement in the then-transforming agriculture. Better work 
opportunities outside of agriculture are expected to decrease the eligible persons' interest in external 
ownership. In an opposite situation, employee ownership in agricultural companies may be seen as an 
attempt to save jobs and maintain social stability (e.g. Earle and Estrin 1996).    
 
Variables that are further used in the principle component analysis should help to understand 
the ownership structure and their development in more detail. These are the age of the company 
(COMPAGE), its legal form (COOP) which indicates if the company is a cooperative or another form, 
a variable representing whether the current company is a successor of a whole company which 
functioned during socialism or took over only a part (PART), the share of owners among managers 
(OWNMANSH), the intention to decrease the number of owners (OWNDECR), voting system 
(VOTING) which is a variable for democratic voting (one owner, one voice) or a share-reflecting 
voting system, and tree variables as proxies for principal-agent problems – disputes between the 
owners and managers (MANOWNDISP), degree of owners’ engagement in company matters 
(OWNENGM), and problems with employees' work ethic (MORALPROB). The component analysis 
also considers three additional capital structure variables – the degree of capital depreciation 
(DEPREC), degree of indebtedness from transformation claims (TRANSFDEBT), and bank loan 
indebtedness (CREDDEBT) - and variable for investment activity (INVACT) represented by the share 
of investment on total assets. 
 
 
5  RESULTS 
 
 
The empirical analysis shows ambiguous results with regard to the effect of farm ownership 
form on performance. Tests of endogeneity confirmed the existence of this problem, thus choosing the 
2SLS estimation procedure proved relevant. The performance model estimates are presented in Table 
1. Controlling for endogeneity, most results suggest an insignificant ownership effect on Czech farms’ 
performance, implying that both might be determined by the same factors. Only Models 3, 7 and 9 
show a significant influence of ownership on farm performance; these are, however, sensitive to the 
performance and ownership form measures. Estimates in Model 3 imply that a higher share of 
managerial ownership has a negative effect on farm Return on Assets when calculated from Gross 
Farm Surplus including operational subsidies, while results from Model 9 indicate that managerial 
ownership has a positive effect on labor productivity. These contrary results suggest that managers’ 
higher ownership shares could improve the decision-making in the company and increase managers 
incentives, which would lead to higher productivity. A deeper analysis of the managerial ownership 
correlations with other farm specifics disclosed that the found ownership effect could be a result of 
related improvement of voting system which is derived from the owners equity shares, and a higher 
share of settled transformation debts. Comparing Models 3 and 6 suggests that companies with higher 
managerial ownership are acquiring lesser operational subsidies.  Model 7 further shows that 
ownership concentration significantly improves the company’s productivity, but is not proved to 
influence the financial indicators of profitability. 
 
  9TABLE 1  Two-Stage Least Square Regression Estimates for the Profitability-Ownership 
Relationship  
Y = PROFIT1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
X Param.  St.  dev.  Param.  St. dev.  Param.  St. dev. 
CAPCONC  -0.002 0.002  -0.002 0.002  -0.002 0.002 
EXTERNOWN  8.578  5.716 - - - - 
EMPLOWN  - -  2.878  9.012 - - 
MANOWN  - - - -  -5.049*  3.076 
DIRAGE  0.086* 0.049 0.048 0.090 0.051 0.055 
MANAGAGE -0.145  0.102  -0.334*** 0.096 -0.159*  0.089 
DIREDUC  -0.077 0.721  -0.373 0.903 0.299 0.760 
SIZE  0.006 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.004 
LIQUIDITY  0.396 0.373 0.197 0.476 0.616 0.390 
DEBT -0.044  0.028  -0.014 0.024  -0.021 0.023 
Constant 6.691  6.391  19.898*** 6.497 11.180**  5.553 
Y = PROFIT2  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
X Param.  St.  dev.  Param.  St. dev.  Param.  St. dev. 
CAPCONC  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.003 
EXTERNOWN  -0.933  6.933 - - - - 
EMPLOWN  - -  -19.747  14.269 - - 
MANOWN  - - - -  -4.390  3.414 
DIRAGE  0.091 0.059 0.224 0.143 0.075 0.061 
MANAGAGE -0.137  0.124  -0.091 0.152  -0.102 0.098 
DIREDUC  1.302 0.875 1.749 1.430  1.601* 0.843 
SIZE  0.015*** 0.005  0.029**  0.001  0.013*** 0.004 
LIQUIDITY  0.756* 0.453  1.312* 0.754  0.803* 0.432 
DEBT -0.026  0.034  -0.060 0.038  -0.043* 0.026 
Constant -3.609  7.752  -4.233 10.288 -2.286  6.162 
Y = LABORPROD  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
X Param.  St.  dev.  Param.  St. dev.  Param.  St. dev. 
CAPCONC  0.0001*  0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EXTERNOWN  -0.286  0.199 - - - - 
EMPLOWN  - -  -0.008  0.221 - - 
MANOWN  - - - -  0.191**  0.085 
DIRAGE  -0.001 0.002  -0.001 0.002  -0.002 0.002 
MANAGAGE -0.004  0.004  -0.002 0.002  -0.002 0.002 
DIREDUC  0.022 0.025 0.031 0.022 0.015 0.021 
SIZE  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LIQUIDITY  0.009 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 
DEBT  0.000 0.001  -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Constant 0.765***  0.222  0.518*** 0.159  0.526*** 0.153 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 
The other parameters in the PROFIT1 model in Table 1 imply that director’s age improves the 
farm Return on Assets when calculated from Gross Farm Surplus including operational subsidies, 
which could relate to the older directors’ networking in various forms of associations. On the other 
hand, the average age of other management members has a negative effect on profitability implying 
that higher managers’ age decreases the human capital of the company. However, when estimating the 
effect of ownership on PROFIT2 as Return on Assets not including operational subsidies and thus 
relating to the purely farm financial performance, the effect of management is overtaken by the 
significant effect of size and farms’ liquidity. These findings support the premise that size and 
liquidity increase the company value and explain farms’ financial performance more than ownership, 
which is predicted by theories that use an innovation oriented, dynamic and path-dependent approach 
to explain firm performance (Ekeland 2002). In Model 6, the overall indebtedness of the company is 
also found to have a negative impact on profitability. 
 
Despite these unstable results and low evidence of the ownership effect on performance, we 
can learn a lot from analyzing the structure of the performance, ownership and ownership development 
variables using multivariate data analysis methods. The ownership forms as defined by variables in the 
performance model can occur in farms in sub-categories or their combinations and thus influence 
performance in various ways that would not be detectable by the above-presented model. We carried 
out a principal component and K-means cluster analysis on variables described in section 4 and 
  10derived the farm groups described below. The objective of the component analysis is not only to find 
the relationship between ownership and performance variables without a causality setting, but also to 
detect a smaller number of composite variables which would represent the original variables, thereby 
allowing the next multivariate technique, cluster analysis, to be made more parsimonious. First, a 
description of the principal component analysis follows. 
 
We use 166 observations for the component analysis, where the number of observations varies 
for respective variables due to missing values, but is not lower than 124. In general, the component 
factor analysis transforms the correlation matrix, in our case a non-parametric Kendall’s tau 
correlation matrix, through the estimation of factor models into a  factor matrix. We examine the 
empirical adequacy of the chosen variables for factor analysis on the individual and overall basis using 
measures of sampling adequacy (MSA) derived from mutual correlations between variables. We 
omitted variables whose individual MSA was lower than 0.5. This criterion thus determined the 
elimination of variables for investment activity from the analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA gives 
the value of 0.68, which meets the necessary threshold for sampling adequacy (minimum 0.50). 
Another criterion for variable inclusion are communalities of a value of at least 0.5, which gives the 
sum of squared factor loadings and indicates that the estimated factors explain at least 50% of the 
variance of each variable. Also, higher factor loadings of one variable in a number of factors is 
inconvenient for the factoring and result interpretation. Due to this, the variable SIZE was omitted 
from the analysis. To determine the number of factors which group mutually-correlated variables, we 
use the Latent root criterion, which suggests retaining those factors whose eigenvalue (unity variance) 
exceeds value 1. This indicates that each factor explains at least the variance of one variable. This 
criterion derived seven factors with an explanatory power of 12.1 variables, implying that they explain 
63.9 % of the total variance of the 19 variables. The index for this solution is thus high and the 
variables are in fact highly related to one another. The interpretation of the unrotated factor matrix is, 
in general, extremely difficult and theoretically less meaningful. Therefore, we proceed to the factor 
matrix rotation which simplifies the interpretation. Orthogonal Varimax rotation provides uncorrelated 
factors. Table 2 includes variables in groupings determined by factor loadings higher than 0.5 and the 
factors’ labelling and description.  
 
Results from the principal component analysis in Table 2 indicate that the 19 variables pertain 
to seven distinct dimensions. Within the first dimension, factor 1, there is the trade-off between the 
cooperative legal form, intention to decrease the number of owners, company age and degree of 
depreciation.  The high degree of common variance between these variables suggest that significant 
share of cooperative legal form of agricultural companies is likely to be established in the early years 
of transition. These companies are simultaneously assigned by high capital depreciation and an 
intention to decrease the number of owners in the upcoming three to five years. These characteristics 
suggest that factor 1 groups variables describing the degree of companies’ reorganization.  
 
The variables’ grouping in factor 2 implies that ownership concentration expressed as the size 
of proportionate ownership, overall indebtedness and the share of debts from liabilities to eligible 
persons to their transformation and restitution claims are highly mutually correlated. However, it is 
important to note that the higher the debts the lower ownership concentration. Factor 3 suggests that 
there is further a trade-off between share of external owners and the style of decision making in the 
company. The higher share of external owners on total number of owners the more likely has the 
company switched to a different that one vote one member (shareholder) voting system. Factor 4 
groups two profitability measures. 
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Structure, Development and Performance Variables 






Degree of reorganization – Factor 1 positively correlates with the 
cooperative legal form of a company,  company’s intention to 
decrease the number of owners, company’s age, and degree of 





Ownership concentration – Factor 2 positively correlates with  
ownership concentration and negatively correlates with the degree 
of overall indebtedness and indebtedness from transformation. 
EXTEROWN -0.719  3 
VOTING 0.550 
Investor ownership – Factor 3 negatively correlates with the 
degree of external ownership and positively correlates with the 
voting system which preserves the one owner. 
PROFIT1 0.890  4 
PROFIT2 0.886 
Profitability – Factor 4 positively correlates with Returns on 
Assets when calculated from Gross Farm Surplus and Returns on 
Assets when calculated from Gross Farm Surplus not including 





Owners-managers-workers relationship – Factor 5 positively 
correlates with variables for interests differences between managers 
and owners and for problems of workers’ working moral, and 






Employee ownership – Factor 6 positively correlates with the 
share of owners among managers and the share of employed 
owners on the total number of employees (employee ownership), 
and negatively correlates with the variable for partition of the 
former company.  
CREDDEBT 0.754  7 
MANOWN -0.622 
Managerial ownership – Factor 7 positively correlates with the 




The principal component analysis further disclosed that the higher interest differences 
between owners and managers the lower owners’ engagement in the companies’ operation and the 
larger problems with workers’ working moral. This mutual relation is presented on factor 5. The 
causality in this relationship remains unclear. It could be the owners’ and simultaneously workers’ low 
interest in the company’ maintenance, which causes the owners’ and managers’ interest differences. 
Factor 6 is highly correlated with the share of owners among managers and the share of employed 
owners on the total number of employees (employee ownership), and the partition of the former 
company. It suggests that companies with higher share of employee ownership, i.e. which hire less 
external labor are more likely be managed by owners and are companies which retained their original 
pre-transition size. Factor 7 implies that companies where managers have larger proportionate 
ownership are more likely to have lower share of credit debts. This evokes many questions which 
could only speculatively be answered in this point.    
 
We computed factor scores from the variable standardized values and their factor loadings to 
the factors. These factor scores are further used in K-means cluster analysis
1. The main objective of 
the cluster analysis is to detect distinct groups of similar enterprises with respect to their ownership 
form and performance. Cluster analysis is used to discover structure in the data without imposing any 
causality. It is not a tool for statistical significance testing; it is an exploratory data analysis which uses 
a clustering algorithm that puts objects into clusters according to well-defined similarity rules 
(StatSoft 1984-2004). The K-mean cluster analysis, which is more relevant for larger samples of 
observations (above 100) and allows a pair-wise exclusion of missing values, starts with k random 
clusters pre-determined by the researcher, and then moves objects between those clusters with the aim 
                                                           
1 The variables INVACT for investment activity and SIZE, which were omitted from the factor analysis, could 
be taken in the cluster analysis. However, this is not followed since they correlate with a number of derived 
factor scores. 
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the most significant ANOVA results.  
 
The cluster analysis determined the best solution for five clusters; k = 5 (see Table 3). The 
scores for factor 7 was excluded from the analysis since it did not classify well the differences between 
observations. To interpret the results, we examine first the means for each cluster on each variable to 
assess in which variables and how distinct the detected farm groups are. In table 3, we indicate with a 
sign only these variables in which the groups of enterprises vary markedly, in other words, in which 
the clusters’ means are distinctly different from zero
2. The signs imply in which variables are clusters 
different and in which they are similar. For example, cluster 1 and cluster 3 are similar with respect to 
the ownership concentration and the share of investor ownership, but these characteristics distinguish 
them significantly form enterprises in cluster 2 and cluster 4.   
 












Degree of reorganization  - + - + - 
Ownership concentration  - + - + - 
Investor ownership  - + - +  
Profitability  + + -  -   
Owners-managers-workers relationship  -   +  + 
Employee ownership  -     
 
To analyze the clusters in more detail, we have a closer look at the means of the original 
variables in the important factors and of other variables of interest. These are presented in Table 4. 
 
Cluster 1 groups mostly Limited liability companies with on average 7 owners and highly 
concentrated ownership. With 41 workers and 1,200 ha, these companies belong to the smaller legal 
entities. Their ownership structure is such that, compare to other companies, they have a lower share 
of external owners. On the other hand they hire a significantly higher share of external labor, which is 
expected with such a small number of owners. The decision-making system is mostly one vote one 
shareholder, which might be in the case of each owner’s high share an important principle. It is 
important to point out that, among these companies, it is very rare that managers own higher shares 
that other owners. This clustering supports in section 2 discussed observation that the establishment of 
Limited liability companies was often initiated by former collective or state farms managers, who 
approached the largest restituents to jointly establish a company. With respect to the internal 
organization, the number of workers per manager is significantly lower than in other companies which 
might improve the effectiveness of workers monitoring. The performance indicators - profitability, 
labor productivity as well as investment activity - imply that this group of companies is doing 
markedly better that any other companies’ group. Since the ownership concentration seems to result in 
improved owners’ incentive structure, reduction of decision-making as well as organizational costs, it 
is expected to play a major role in this economic success. 
 
                                                           
2 Cluster analysis uses variables’ standardized values, thus zero indicates the sample mean. 
  13TABLE 4  Cluster means 
Classifying variables  Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5 
Degree of reorganization        
 -   Legal form  77% LLT  81% JSC  94% Coops  93% JSC  98% Coops 
 -   Share of enterprises intending to  
decrease the number of owners  5% 27%  81%  29%  88% 
 -   Company age in 2003  11 years  7 years  12 years  7 years  12 years 















 -   Share of enterprises established 
from a part of former company  95% 57% 74% 79% 65% 
 -   Share of enterprises with one vote 
one shareholder voting system  86% 10% 78%  0%  48% 
Ownership concentration        
 -   Capital stock per owner (CZK)  221,000   316,000   78,000   274,000   128,000  
 -   Shareholders’ capital per owner  2,032,000   307,000   -43,000   251,000   255,000 
 -   Number of owners  7  510 180 440 280 
 -   Indebtedness (DEBT)  85% 30% 75% 28% 50% 
Investor ownership         
 -   Share of external owners on total 
number of owners  20 84 66 82 75 
Employee ownership       
 -   Share of employed owners on total 
number of employees  15 66 51 64 61 
Managerial ownership       
 -   Share of enterprises with larger   











Profitability        
 -   Return on Assets (PROFIT 1)  7.1 6.2 2.3 -0.6 6.1 
Labor  productivity       
 -   Total revenues / total work hours  457 CZK  432 CZK  352 CZK  340 CZK  402 CZK 
Owners-managers-workers interest 
differences  Low    High  High 
Investment  activity       
 -  Share of the value of investment in  
    2001-03 on tot. asset value in 2003   11.7%  10.8%  6.9%  5.4%  7.2% 
 -  Depreciation rate   50%  34%  56%  42%  53% 
 
Cluster 2 and Cluster 4 classify companies with similar ownership structures. They are mostly 
Joint stock companies which were established later in transition; in the second wave of  transformation 
of agricultural cooperatives. They are also similar with respect to their average share size, which is 
significantly lower that in companies in cluster 1, however, higher than in companies in cluster 3 and 
4. Compare to other groups, the cluster 2 and 4 also include higher share of companies with higher 
managerial ownership shares. This would suggest that transforming to JSC allowed interested 
managers to acquire higher ownership shares. They are also marked with lower indebtedness which 
corresponds with the praxis of capitalizing transformation liabilities to eligible persons to the company 
assets (transformation claims) through changing legal form to JSC, i.e. turning liabilities into 
ownership shares. This corresponds to the high share of external owners. However, these two groups 
of enterprises significantly vary in their performance indicators, therefore, it is especially interesting to 
analyze their differences. First, companies in cluster 2 and 4 markedly differ in their size. The better 
performing companies in group 2 are assigned by larger size, but also by the fact that high share of 
these companies retained their original pre-transition form (they were not partitioned). The companies 
in group 4 were mostly parts of the original companies, which could suggest that the “new” owners 
were not interested in retaining the original enterprise. This could be conformed by the high interest 
  14differences between owners and managers and be especially a case, if the company did previously not 
perform well. The higher depreciation rate in these companies compared to companies in cluster 2 
could relate to the owners lesser interest to invest and/or to the fact that better capital was segregated. 
The differences between cluster 2 and 4 suggest that previous (pre-transition) performance is not as 
important for the development of the legal and organizational form of a company as it is important for 
its now-a-days economic performance. This is because good former performance, i.e. quality of the 
former management, can contribute to new owners’ interests to support the management in strategic 
decisions and lower decision-making costs. On the other hand, information asymmetries and low 
market value of new owners shares allow even less-well performing companies and their management 
to achieve their strategic goals, e.g. change of their legal form. Their development is, however, 
burdened by lacking owners’ incentives and the conflict of interests. Acquiring higher ownership 
shares and changing voting system in such way that it reflex the share size seems to be the managers 
strategy to gain decision-making flexibility and to reduce agency costs.  
 
Cluster 3 and cluster 5 also provide some similarities in their organizational and ownership 
structures. The significant majority of the companies have a cooperative legal form. Their year of 
official establishment suggests that they are successors of former cooperatives or their parts (especially 
cluster 3). These mostly cooperatives are assigned by lower average ownership shares than are 
companies in other clusters. This could explain their intention to decrease the number of owners in the 
next three to five years and suggest their still relatively early stage of transformation. Comparing the 
two clusters, these arguments are even more relevant for cluster 3 than cluster 5. Companies in cluster 
3 are still lacking in their reorganization behind companies in cluster 5. The average share in 
companies of cluster 3 is smaller than in companies of cluster 5 and markedly higher share of 
companies in cluster 3 retained the one vote one member voting system. The higher capital 
depreciation rate and smaller size of companies in cluster 3 indicate that companies in cluster 4 were 
more successful in preventing partition and segregation of their better assets through restitutions or 
giving over property to persons eligible to transformation claims. Similarly to clusters 2 and 4, also 
here, the intuition is that only companies with better and trustworthy management (formally better 
performing companies) could retain their assets. This argumentation is supported by performance 
indicators in Table 4, but also with the average manager age and education comparison between the 
clusters 3 and 5
3.  
 
Important to note is also that cooperatives in cluster 5 perform better than JSC in cluster 4. 
This predicates that existing legal and organizational forms are still partially a result of intentions, 
social concerns and personalities of people in decisive positions with superior bargaining powers. The 
comparison of ownership forms, performance of other companies characteristics also suggest that, in 
general, management strives to maintain companies’ original size. However, better performing 
companies rather succeed in this objective. 
 
    
6  CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this paper we analyzed the relationship between large-scale farm ownership structures and 
the farms’ economic performance in the case of Czech agriculture. We aimed to identify the structure 
in large-scale farms’ characteristics which could explain the often- presented ambiguous empirical 
results regarding large-scale farms’ economic performance. We first used a conventional approach to 
analyze the ownership form effect on performance. As performance indicators, we used often applied 
profitability measures, but also measured labor productivity. By means of instrumental variables in the 
performance regression model, we controlled for possible ownership endogeneity. Exploratory data 
analyses were used to identify the combination of ownership characteristics and performance 
indicators in heterogeneous groups of similar large-scale farms. 
 
                                                           
3 The differences are not significant. The average director age in cluster 3 is 47.6 while in cluster 5, it is 47.3 
years. In remaining groups varies the group average director age between 45.8 to 47.1. Similar results hold for 
education.  
  15We found large heterogeneity in the ownership structures of Czech agricultural companies. 
Statistical tests revealed that the analysis of ownership effect on economic performance can be 
significantly influenced by the problem of ownership endogeneity. Estimations of nine analogous 
performance models controlling for this endogeneity problem disclosed no significant influence of 
ownership on performance in most cases; the estimates rather suggested that these two variables have 
common factors. However, these results are partially ambiguous. In two models, the effect of 
managerial ownership proved to be significant, but nevertheless indicated contrary directions. The 
results suggest that managers owning higher equity shares improves the labor productivity of the farm, 
while also significantly decreases its financial performance. As more detailed analysis implies, the 
former could be the result of an improved decision-making system, and the latter the result of the 
higher share of settled transformation debts. In one model, capital concentration was also found to 
positively influence labor productivity. In three models, age of the director and other management 
members was found to be significant. Three other models explaining profitability imply a significant 
effect of size and farms’ liquidity. These findings support the theoretical arguments that size and 
liquidity increase the companies’ value and explain farms’ financial performance more than 
ownership. This is usually predicted by theories that use an innovation-oriented, dynamic and path-
dependent approach to explain firm performance (Ekeland 2002). Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the 
ownership effect results from the performance measures makes the derivation of general conclusion 
difficult. The result suggest that profitability derived from farms’ accounting is not a very effective 
measure of performance since investment activity and strategy chosen with respect to settling 
transformation debts could influence the company value that is not well captured by the accounting. In 
future research, more exact and comprehensive measures of farm performance should be found. 
 
Applying cluster analysis in the second stage of the analysis, we detected five groups of large-
scale farms. The results of the farm groups comparison suggest that higher performance is (a) related 
to lower principal-agent problems, which could be a result of improved ownership structure through 
the reduction of number of owners, increased ownership concentration and higher managerial 
ownership, but also (b) pre-determines the ownership structure transformation. The choice of 
ownership structure, similar to company performance, seems, assuming managers’ high bargaining 
power, to reflect management quality or social concerns. Furthermore, we found that analogical 
ownership structures, and especially legal forms, can relate to economic successes as well as failures. 
Deeper analysis of this issue suggests that the ownership structure-performance relationship depends 
on whether the ownership structure was a result of a business strategy or happened out of necessity. 
Ownership concentration and low investors’ ownership can help to appraise the created value since 
decisions on investment and business strategies are done more easily. On the other hand, in companies 
with low inherited equity value, efficient ownership assigned by high concentration and low share of 
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NOTES 
 
1 Jarmila Curtiss is a researcher at the Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and 
Eastern Europe (IAMO), Halle (Salle), Germany. Tomáš Ratinger and Tomáš Medonos are 
researchers at the Research Institute of Agricultural Economics (VUZE) in Prague, Czech Republic. 
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support of the data collection from IAMO and the 
National Agency for Agricultural Economics of the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the research of 
Jarmila Curtiss has been supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship of the European Community 
programme “Improving the Human Research Potential and the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base” 
under contract number HPMD-CT-2001-00063. The author is solely responsible for the information 
communicated, published or disseminated; it does not represent the opinion of the Community, and 
Community is not responsible for any use that might be made of the data appearing herein. 
2 During the 1950’s, the first wave of collectivization based on the principle “one village – one 
collective farm took place (500 – 600 ha). In the 1970’s, the second wave of collectivization was 
based on the principle “more villages – one collective farm” (3,000 – 8,000 ha), which resulted in 
extremely large farm sizes (Doucha and Divila 2001). The state farms were founded and operated on 
non-inhabited land usually in border and mountainous region, land of farms  that originally belonged 
to aristocratic families and the church, land of expropriated farmers with more than 50 hectares, on 
confiscated land which belongs to Germans and traitors who were send to Germany after the Second 
World War, and later on land that originally belonged to continuously non-prosperous collective farms 
(Majerová 2000, Chloupková 2001).  
3 Since the principal component analysis belongs to standard tools of data analysis and does 
not require concrete model specification, it will not be discussed in more detail in the paper. The only 
exceptional facet of our approach is the use of non-parametric Kendall’s tau correlations for the 
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following component analysis, which is viewed as more appropriate for models including ordinal 
variables. The criteria for variable choice, number of components and other estimates of quality 
characteristics will be discussed in the results section. We further apply K-means cluster analysis on 
factoral scores obtained by the component analysis for classifying homogeneous enterprises into from 
each other different groups. 
4 Gross Farm Surplus is equal to Gross Value Added from the production and sale of goods 
plus (select) operational subsidies less labour costs and taxes linked to production, and represents the 
funds (resources) that the farm has at its disposal to face its past and current financial commitments 
and to invest in the future. Gross Value Added from production and sales is equal to total production 
(revenues from own agricultural and non-agricultural products and service, plus change in inventory 
of own products, plus capitalization) minus production consumption (consumption of material and 
energy plus services) plus revenues from sold goods, minus expenses on sold goods.  
5 Operational subsidies are direct commodity payments plus less favored area (LFA) payments 
plus agro-environmental payments. 
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